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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Scholars have long criticized the federal courts for their inappropriate grants of 
summary judgment in Title VII cases.1 Empirical research supports the scholars’ 
concerns about summary judgment and also tends to demonstrate an “anti-plaintiff 
effect” in employment discrimination cases in all stages in federal court. Empirical 
studies demonstrate that employment discrimination plaintiffs are at a significant 
disadvantage in both the federal district courts and in the federal courts of appeals.2 
Plaintiffs’ win rates in employment discrimination cases at both pretrial adjudication 
and trial stages are significantly below those of plaintiffs in non-employment 
discrimination cases.3 Curiously, plaintiffs’ win rates in employment discrimination 
trials with a judicial fact finder, rather than a jury, are significantly lower than those 
of plaintiffs who have juries hear their cases.4 Perhaps even more surprising—
especially acknowledging the low win rates of plaintiffs in employment discrimination 
cases in the trial-level courts—the courts of appeals reverse plaintiffs’ employment 
1. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People 
Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 791 (2002); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the 
Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 
203 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate 
Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517 (2010) [hereinafter 
Schneider, The Changing Shape]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and 
Federal Civil Litigation, 59 Rutgers L. Rev. 705 (2007) [hereinafter Schneider, The Dangers of Summary 
Judgment]. Recently, scholars have also expressed concerns about the effects of two employment 
discrimination suits: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), which overturned the liberal 
pleading standard and required facial plausibility for a pleading to survive a motion to dismiss in an 
antitrust suit, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), which applied Twombly to a civil rights suit and 
stated that Twombly’s holding is not limited to antitrust suits. See, e.g., Schneider, The Changing Shape, 
supra; Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 179 (2010); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble 
with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
1011 (2009).
2. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: 
From Bad to Worse?, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 103, 127 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, From 
Bad to Worse] (finding that over the period from 1979 to 2006, the win rate for plaintiffs’ employment 
discrimination cases in federal district court was 15%, much lower than the 51% win rate for non-
employment cases); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & 
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare].
3. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 2, at 128–29. Plaintiffs in employment discrimination 
cases during the period 1979 to 2006 have won 3.59% of pretrial adjudications, whereas plaintiffs in non-
employment cases have won 21.05% of the pretrial adjudications. Id. at 128. At trial, plaintiffs win at a rate 
of 28.47% in employment discrimination cases whereas non-employment plaintiffs win at a rate of 44.94%. 
This gap, however, has been closing recently in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which granted a jury 
trial right in Title VII cases. Id. at 129.
4. The Clermont & Schwab study shows that the win rate of employment discrimination cases heard by 
juries is 37.63%, compared to 44.41% for other non-employment discrimination cases. Id. at 130. In 
contrast, the win rate of employment discrimination plaintiffs in judge trials is only 19.62%, and the 
win rate of plaintiffs in non-employment judge trials is 45.53%. Id.
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discrimination wins at a much higher rate than they reverse defendants’ employment 
discrimination victories.5
 A number of theories may account for these disparities. Some argue that 
employment discrimination cases are weaker than other types of cases and, therefore, 
the good employment discrimination cases settle before adjudication.6 But there is no 
evidence to support this claim.7 Empirical studies demonstrate that employment 
discrimination cases tend to settle later in the litigation process and go to trial more 
frequently than non-employment cases.8 The later settlements may occur because 
many employers, when faced with an employment discrimination case, file motions 
for summary judgment. When the employers lose these motions, they are more likely 
to make serious offers of settlement.9 This strategy has a distinct advantage for the 
employer. Because employers may more easily bear the burden of costly discovery, 
and because courts tend to grant motions for summary judgment at a relatively high 
rate, it is beneficial for employers and their lawyers to wait until the motion for 
summary judgment is decided.10
 Moreover, while there was a large increase of employment discrimination cases 
brought in the early 1990s, a sharp decline of cases brought in federal court has 
occurred since 1998.11 Employment discrimination scholars Kevin Clermont and 
Stewart Schwab suggest that the sharp drop responds to a hostile climate in federal 
courts toward employment discrimination claims.12 The decrease suggests that 
5. See id. at 111. Courts of appeals reverse plaintiffs’ employment discrimination pretrial adjudications at a 
rate of 30%; they reverse defendants’ pretrial adjudications at a rate of 11%. They reverse plaintiffs’ trial 
wins at a rate of 41% and defendants’ trial wins at a rate of 9%. Id.
6. See Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Discrimination 
Settlements, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 111, 118 (2007).
7. See id. at 144 (concluding from an empirical study of settlements that plaintiffs neither bring frivolous 
suits nor receive unnecessary windfalls, but also concluding that the mean settlement was $54,651 with 
a median of $30,000, which was congruent with lost wages). This sample included only settlements that 
occurred as a result of judicial intervention through settlement conferences with magistrates. It did not 
include those cases that did not settle after the conferences or cases that settled with no judicial 
intervention. See id. at 130–31. 
8. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 2, at 122–23 (finding that 37% of employment 
discrimination cases ended earlier in the litigation process, compared with 59% of non-employment 
cases); Clermont & Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare, supra note 2, at 440 
(finding that employment discrimination cases settle less frequently than other cases).
9. See Kotkin, supra note 6, at 149 (finding that denial of a summary judgment motion to the defendant is 
linked to higher settlement outcomes). 
10. See id. at 122, 125; Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? 
Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 
175, 178, 195 (2010).
11. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 2, at 119.
12. See id. at 121. In their earlier article, Clermont and Schwab state:
Employment discrimination plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe. They manage many fewer 
happy resolutions early in litigation, and so they have to proceed toward trial more often. 
They win a lower proportion of cases during pretrial and at trial. Then, more of their 
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plaintiffs and their lawyers may be screening their cases more carefully before filing 
in court. If so, one would expect the plaintiffs to be filing only the stronger cases. 
Consequently, plaintiffs’ success rates should have risen since 1998. There is no 
evidence that they have risen, however. In fact, they have remained fairly constant.13
 Law professor Katie Eyer attributes the poor showing of employment 
discrimination plaintiffs to fundamental American beliefs concerning meritocracy 
and discrimination.14 She explains that psychological research demonstrates that 
most people in most situations are “unwilling to make robust attributions of 
discrimination.”15 An unwillingness to make attributions to discrimination would 
certainly account in part for the poor rates of success of employment discrimination 
plaintiffs, but it does not explain why plaintiffs enjoy higher success rates in jury 
trials than in bench trials.16 Nor does it fully explain the very high reversal rate of 
plaintiffs’ successful employment discrimination claims in the courts of appeals. 
Clermont and Schwab attribute a “double standard” to the courts of appeals when it 
comes to employment discrimination cases, which results in an “anti-plaintiff 
effect.”17 They state:
Study of appeals is . . . essential to understanding employment discrimination 
litigation. One can easily see that these plaintiffs do not do well in the district 
courts, although it is difficult to say exactly why. One can, with more effort see 
that these plaintiffs do not do well in the courts of appeals and here one can 
somewhat more solidly conclude that judicial attitudes are at play. The anti-
plaintiff effect on appeal raises the specter that federal appellate courts have a 
double standard for employment discrimination cases, harshly scrutinizing 
employees’ victories below while gazing benignly at employers’ victories.18
 Whether the “anti-plaintiff effect” is based on conscious, discriminatory attitudes 
on the part of judges is unlikely and unknowable. What we do know is that the gap in 
success between employment discrimination plaintiffs and defendants raises serious 
questions about procedural and substantive fairness, and the proper role of judges and 
juries. Moreover, it may threaten the perceived legitimacy of the federal courts.
successful cases are appealed. On appeal, they have a harder time upholding their 
successes and reversing adverse outcomes.
 Clermont & Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare, supra note 2, at 429.
13. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. 
Empirical Legal Stud. 111 (2009).
14. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 
96 Minn. L. Rev. 1275 (2012).
15. Id. at 1278. The term “attributions to discrimination” is a psychology term of art that describes whether 
people attribute a negative outcome to discrimination. Id. at 1278 n.7.
16. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 2, at 130–31.
17. See id. at 115.
18. Id.
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 The new literature on cognitive illiberalism, which has yet to be applied in the 
employment discrimination context,19 considers the effect of judges’ grants of 
summary judgment and their statements that no reasonable jury could find different 
facts. Law professors Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald Braman performed 
an empirical study20 to investigate the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Scott v. Harris 
that no reasonable person would find, having viewed a videotape of a police chase of 
a suspect, that the officer’s decision to ram the suspect’s car was unjustifiable.21 The 
study results showed that even when faced with a videotape of events, people of 
different cultural viewpoints and identities interpreted the facts differently.22 In fact, 
based on established scales measuring cultural worldviews—whether a person is a 
communitarian or an individualist, hierarchical or egalitarian—responses were, to a 
large extent, predictable.23 The study demonstrated that it is not only the inferences 
that people draw from facts, but the facts themselves that differ depending on who 
the viewer of the videotape is.
 While the cognitive illiberalism research does not study how groups such as 
juries interact and make decisions, it does question the judge’s role in determining 
what a “reasonable jury” would decide in a given context.24 If a substantial minority 
of the population would see facts in a way that diverges from the way the judge (or a 
majority of judges on a panel) sees the facts, doesn’t that mean that the viewpoint is 
not unreasonable? And, isn’t it odd for the appellate courts to consider a particular 
factual interpretation unreasonable given that lower court judges and even some 
members of the appellate court viewed the facts differently from the majority?
 With the empirical studies in mind, this article explores the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs in a high profile “reverse” race 
discrimination case, Ricci v. DeStefano.25 It considers whether cultural cognition—
“the unconscious influence of individuals’ group commitments on their perceptions 
of legally consequential facts”26—explains the Supreme Court’s decision to grant 
19. Paul Secunda wrote an excellent article applying the theory to labor law and equal protection law in the 
public employment context. See Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
107 (2010).
20. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837 (2009) (demonstrating through an empirical study that black, low-
income workers and residents of the Northeast tended to see what happened on the videotape differently 
from what the Supreme Court and the majority of subjects saw).
21. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
22. See Kahan et al., supra note 20, at 841.
23. See id. at 859, 879.
24. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 759, 760 (2009) (arguing 
that when judges make decisions about what a “reasonable jury” would conclude, they actually decide 
whether they themselves could find for the plaintiff or think the evidence is sufficient, not whether a 
reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff or think the evidence is sufficient).
25. See 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
26. Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 
Stan. L. Rev. 851, 851 (2012).
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summary judgment to the plaintiffs in Ricci v. DeStefano, rather than to remand the 
case for factual development. It concludes that the Court’s analysis of the facts in 
Ricci was likely influenced by cultural cognition, and, as a result, the Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the plaintiffs in Ricci was improper.
 In Ricci, white firefighters who did well on a 2003 promotional exam sued the 
City of New Haven for intentional discrimination under Title VII when the City 
threw out the test results because it allegedly feared a disparate impact cause of action 
under Title VII by minority firefighters who were unsuccessful on the exam.27 While 
the lower courts agreed with the defendants that remedial action that took race into 
account did not violate Title VII where the test in question clearly had a disparate 
impact on minority applicants, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the lower courts. 
In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that the City and the other defendants had 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs and had therefore violated Title VII 
as a matter of law by throwing out the test results. Many scholars have criticized the 
Court’s analysis with reference to the substantive law,28 but there is scant discussion 
of the procedural aspects of the case.29 Because the substance and procedure are 
inextricably interrelated in the case, this article discusses both, but only for the 
purpose of considering the Court’s procedural ruling. In Ricci, unlike any other 
recent Title VII case, the Supreme Court overturned a lower court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. 
Apparently, there was no “anti-plaintiff effect” in this case. But, given the identities 
of the plaintiffs and defendants in this “reverse discrimination” case, the procedural 
decision makes the case even more intriguing. It raises the question of whether the 
views of the Justices joining the majority concerning the importance of colorblind 
decisionmaking may have consciously or unconsciously affected their decision to 
grant summary judgment to the petitioners.
 Part II of the article analyzes the concepts of cultural cognition and cognitive 
illiberalism and the Court’s summary judgment jurisprudence. It begins with a 
discussion of Scott v. Harris and then discusses an empirical study by Dan Kahan, 
David Hoffman, and Donald Braman and the normative prescriptions Kahan and 
his colleagues make. Part III discusses the various opinions in Ricci, with an emphasis 
on the procedural jurisprudence of the case and, in particular, analyzes Ricci in light 
of Kahan’s cultural cognition and cognitive illiberalism concepts. Part IV concludes 
that it appears that the majority’s substantive views and cultural affiliations affected 
27. See id. at 562.
28. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing 
Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 73 (2010); Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards 
a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 197 (2010); Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci 
v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Colloquy 201 (2009); Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A 
Case of Unintended Consequences?, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1257 (2010).
29. In a relatively brief description of Ricci, Melissa Hart criticized the Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
See Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-2009 Labor and Employment Cases, 13 
Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 253, 257 (2009) (noting that that the majority, Justice Alito’s concurrence, 
and the dissent presented “three very different versions of the facts presented in the record”).
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its procedural ruling. The Ricci majority engaged in unnecessary fact finding, made 
credibility determinations, and drew inferences in favor of the moving party, the 
plaintiffs. This decision was unfortunate because it demonstrated disrespect for those 
subcommunities who would come to a different conclusion in this highly political 
and controversial case.30 While the substantive decision in Ricci itself would likely be 
disappointing to certain subcommunities, it is the Court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment that may do the most damage to the democratic legitimacy of the courts 
because it signals that the courts refuse to hear the voices of those subcommunities 
who may interpret the facts differently than the majority did.
ii. a priMEr On COgnitiVE iLLibEraLisM
 Scott v. Harris is an infamous case.31 In Scott, the plaintiff, Victor Harris, a 
nineteen-year-old African American motorist, was clocked speeding at seventy-three 
miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone.32 The Georgia county police turned 
on their f lashing lights and pursued Harris at high speed.33 Unfortunately, instead of 
stopping, Harris sped up and the police notified other police by radio and continued 
the high-speed chase.34 Timothy Scott, a police officer who heard the radio 
announcement but did not know why the police were pursuing the suspect, joined in 
the pursuit.35 At one point, the police had Harris nearly cornered in a shopping 
center, but Harris turned quickly to evade the police and collided with Scott’s car, 
slightly damaging it.36 Scott then became the first policeman in pursuit. When he 
caught up to Harris after approximately six minutes of pursuit, he hit Harris’s car 
with his bumper, which caused Harris to lose control of his car and the car to spin 
down an embankment. Harris was rendered a paraplegic.37
 Harris sued, alleging that Scott’s decision to bump his car was an unreasonable 
search and seizure that violated his constitutional rights. Defendant Scott filed a 
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the federal district 
court denied the motion.38 The trial court denied summary judgment, holding that 
30. For a discussion demonstrating the political importance of the case, see Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. 
DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 Harv. J.L. & Gender 581, 610–19 (2010). By 
“subcommunities” I refer to different identifiable groups that see facts differently. For example, whites 
versus African Americans, Democrats versus Republicans, egalitarians versus those who believe in 
hierarchy. For elaboration of this concept, see infra notes 51–66 and accompanying text.
31. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
32. See id. at 374.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 375.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 375–76.
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there were genuine issues of material fact on the issue of qualified immunity39 and, on 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.40 It held that, taking the 
facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff Harris, the police officer’s action could 
constitute unnecessary deadly force and, if so, would violate Harris’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. The court of appeals noted that none of the justifications for 
deadly force was present in this case: “Scott did not have probable cause to believe that 
Harris had committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of 
serious physical harm, nor did Harris, prior to the chase, pose an imminent threat of 
serious physical harm to Scott or others.”41 Because the law as it existed at the time 
was sufficiently clear that ramming a vehicle under these circumstances was unlawful, 
there would be no qualified immunity for Scott.42 The case was remanded to the 
federal district court for trial. In the meantime, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.43
 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit. While in most 
circumstances the lower courts should view the facts on a motion for summary 
judgment in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, this case, the Court 
concluded, was an exception because a videotape shot from inside the police officer’s 
car established the facts concerning the chase.44 The Court stated, “When opposing 
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, 
so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of 
the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”45
 Describing the videotape, the Supreme Court stated:
There we see respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the 
dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more 
than a dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in 
both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit. We see it run 
multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of time in the occasional 
center left-turn-only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in 
the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up. Far from being the cautious and 
controlled driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the video more closely 
resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing 
police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.46
39. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348, at *18–19 (N.D. Ga. 
Sept. 25, 2003).
40. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d 807, 821 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e find no reversible error in the denial 
of qualified immunity to Scott at this stage in the case.”).
41. Id. at 815.
42. Scott, 550 U.S. at 376.
43. See Scott v. Harris, 549 U.S. 991 (2006), cert. granted, 550 U.S. 372 (2009).
44. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378–79.
45. Id. at 380.
46. Id. at 379–80.
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 Based on the videotape, eight out of nine Justices47 concluded, “[Harris]’s version 
of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have 
believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it 
should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”48
 Scott v. Harris received significant attention and criticism from procedural 
scholars.49 It seems to have taken the summary judgment law and turned it upside 
down, placing the judge in a fact finding position that is ordinarily reserved for the 
jury. But were scholars being overly critical? Was it true that the videotape “blatantly 
contradicts” the plaintiff ’s factual allegations and inferences such that no reasonable 
jury could conclude that Harris’s driving imposed such a danger to others that it 
justified deadly force? In response, Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald 
Braman, as part of the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School,50 embarked 
on a study to determine whether it was empirically true that a reasonable jury could 
reach only one conclusion: that Harris’s f light imposed sufficient danger on the 
public to justify use of deadly force against him. The study asked more than a 
thousand people from diverse backgrounds and geographical distributions to view 
the videotape and to answer questions about: (1) the relative danger of Victor Harris’s 
and the police’s behavior on the day of the chase; (2) whether Harris’s behavior posed 
a risk to the police and to the public; (3) whether it was worth the danger to the 
public for the police to engage in the high-speed chase; (4) whether Harris or the 
police were at greater relative fault for the risk posed to the public; and, finally, (5) 
whether the danger Harris’s driving posed to the police and the public justified 
Scott’s decision to end the chase in a way that threatened Harris’s life.51
 The results were enlightening. Kahan and his colleagues found that although the 
majority of their subjects agreed with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
videotape, a significant minority did not, and there were marked differences in reactions 
depending on the subgroup to which the subject belonged. For example, African 
Americans’ views were significantly more pro-plaintiff, as were the views of Democrats 
47. See id. at 389 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter. Interestingly, the majority 
never explains why Justice Stevens’s view of the facts is unreasonable. 
48. Id. at 380–81.
49. See, e.g., Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment, supra note 1; Thomas, supra note 24; Michael L. 
Wells, Scott v. Harris and the Role of the Jury in Constitutional Litigation, 29 Rev. Litig. 65 (2009).
50. The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School is a group of scholars who study
how cultural values shape public risk perceptions and related policy beliefs. Cultural 
cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their beliefs about disputed 
matters of fact (e.g., whether global warming is a serious threat; whether the death 
penalty deters murder; whether gun control makes society more safe or less) to values 
that define their cultural identities. Project members are using the methods of various 
disciplines—including social psychology, anthropology, communications, and political 
science—to chart the impact of this phenomenon and to identify the mechanisms 
through which it operates.
 The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale L. Sch., http://www.culturalcognition.net (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2013).
51. Kahan et al., supra note 20, at 857–58.
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compared to Republicans, liberals compared to conservatives, and egalitarians 
compared to persons who believed in hierarchy. Communitarians were significantly 
more pro-plaintiff than individualists.52 Thus, although the majority of test subjects 
agreed with the Supreme Court, dissent from this view was not random across the 
population. “[T]he minority of subjects who disagreed about the appropriateness of 
deadly force were connected by a core of identity-defining characteristics. Indeed, so 
too were members of a minority who formed a view of the facts most unequivocally in 
line with those of the Scott majority.”53
 Kahan and his colleagues explained that “naïve realism” can distort judicial 
decisionmaking. “Naïve realism” is a term of social psychologists that refers to “an 
asymmetry in the ability of most people to identify the effects of value-motivated 
cognition.”54 That is, people are aware that others’ views are very dependent on their 
cultural identities—the “realism” part of the term. But, ironically, they are blind to 
the extent to which their own interpretation of facts depends on their own cultural 
identities—the “naïve” part of the term. Thus, judges—when determining that no 
reasonable jury could find a particular set of facts—may be influenced by their own 
cultural identities without being aware of it. When judges then proclaim that no 
reasonable jury could disagree with them, the courts appear dismissive and smug, 
even contemptuous of others, who, in turn, feel resentment and distrust. This 
dynamic causes “an escalating cycle of recrimination and distrust.”55 The result is a 
state of “cognitive illiberalism.”56
 The authors of the study argue that the tendency to be realistic about others’ 
blind spots and unrealistic about one’s own, and the resulting cycle of resentment 
and recriminations, can have “pernicious consequences” in legal and political 
settings.57 They state:
In such a climate, challenges to group-dominant beliefs become 
indistinguishable from indictments of the integrity and competence of the 
groups’ members. Opposing groups find themselves engaged in relentless, 
symbolic status competition—not over whose partisan view of the good the law 
will endorse, but over whose culturally partisan view of the facts it will credit.58
 According to Kahan and his colleagues, the Scott decision reflects and reinforces 
these dynamics. While the Court might have recognized that there were groups that 
would bristle at the Court’s factual conclusions, it may have attributed those criticisms 
to citizens’ identities and commitment to their own groups. What the Court’s 
majority members likely did not recognize, however, was how their own perceptions 
52. Id. at 867.
53. Id. at 879.
54. Id. at 895.
55. Id. at 896.
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 895.
58. Id. at 896 (emphasis added).
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when watching the tape were “ just as bound up with cultural, ideological, and other 
commitments that disposed them to see the facts in a particular way.”59 The Court’s 
language and disposition likely also called into question the integrity, intelligence, 
and competence of identifiable subcommunities when it declared that no reasonable 
juror could disagree with it.60
 The authors argue that contributing to the dynamic of cognitive illiberalism is not 
necessary. They recommend that judges and justices practice humility to counteract the 
impression that they believe that only their values and perceptions are reasonable.61 
One way to exercise this humility is to avoid granting summary judgment in cases 
where they can imagine that there will be a significant subcommunity that will disagree 
with the court’s factual findings.
 While juries may not be perfect, Kahan and his colleagues argue that a major 
purpose of jury fact finding is democratic legitimacy. Even if a jury does not adopt 
the particular view of a case espoused by a member of a subgroup who is on the jury, 
the process requires others on the jury at least to listen to the member of the cultural 
minority and to dignify his views and experiences.62 While there will always be 
outliers who will disagree with the factual findings of the judge, if an identifiable 
subcommunity would likely feel alienated and excluded by the process, Kahan 
suggests, courts should pause before granting summary judgment63 in order to protect 
the legitimacy of the legal process in the eyes of those subcommunities who may 
experience life differently from the judges.
 Law professor Jeffrey Stempel would likely agree. He argues that the Supreme 
Court and lower federal courts have granted summary judgment in an exceedingly 
aggressive fashion and that Scott v. Harris, combined with the Court’s recent decisions 
in Twombly and Iqbal,64 which make it much easier for defendants to have complaints 
dismissed, permit individual judges to decide cases based on their “gut reaction.”65 
He notes that juries provide a check on the judge’s individual reaction, which may 
not reflect the community values, and permit deliberations and airings of different 
views from different subcommunities. There are also important checks on the jury’s 
59. Id. at 897.
60. Id.
61. See id. 
62. See id. at 901.
63. See id. at 884–87.
64. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (concluding that when deciding motions to dismiss judges 
should look at the allegations of the complaint to determine their plausibility); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that, to state a claim, a plaintiff must provide enough factual 
matter to suggest the allegation, and that an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of 
conspiracy are not sufficient).
65. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate Efficiency, and 
Acceptable Justice, 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 627, 630–31 (2012).
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decisionmaking powers that range from voir dire to evidentiary rules to a trial judge’s 
power to grant post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, if necessary.66
iii. riCCi v. dEstEfanO: cOgnitiVE iLLibErALisM At WOrK
 Ricci is exactly the type of case that should have warranted the Court’s judicial 
humility, a decision to pause, and then move forward. Ricci is an example of injudicious 
judicial fact finding at the highest level. It is an opinion that engendered in its readers 
such preoccupation in the substance that few paid much attention to the procedure. It 
serves as a warning of how judges can, perhaps unconsciously, permit their own world 
views to distort proper procedural protections. Ricci was a highly political case that 
affected different cultural subcommunities very intensely. In a case this controversial, 
democratic legitimacy concerns are at their height. Different cultural experiences 
yield different world views that should have encouraged the Court to pause, at least 
when it came to its procedural decision. Certainly, the Supreme Court case produced 
a state of cognitive illiberalism that it may well have avoided.
 A. Background of the Case
 In Ricci v. DeStefano, the City of New Haven created an exam for firefighters 
who sought promotion to lieutenant and captain positions.67 Before Ricci was decided, 
employers had to take special care in creating tests used to make employment 
decisions. Even in the absence of intent to discriminate, Title VII requires that an 
employer prove that a test that has a negative disparate impact on a protected group 
be job related and consistent with business necessity.68 If it is not, the employer is 
liable for unlawful employment discrimination against the group suffering the 
disparate impact. Aware of its potential liability to black and Hispanic firefighters, 
the City of New Haven hired an independent consultant, I/O Solutions (IOS), for 
$100,000 to create a fair promotional test.69 The consultant performed job analyses 
“to identify the tasks, knowledge, skills, and abilities that are essential for the 
lieutenant and captain positions.”70 IOS interviewed many lieutenants and captains 
and their supervisors about their responsibilities, rode with officers on duty, prepared 
questionnaires and administered them to chiefs, captains, and lieutenants.71 
Throughout this process, IOS intentionally oversampled minority firefighters in an 
66. Id. at 664–71.
67. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 561 (2009). This description is derived in part from Ann C. McGinley, 
Ricci v. DeStefano: Diluting Disparate Impact and Redefining Disparate Treatment, 12 Nev. L.J. 626 
(2012), [hereinafter McGinley, Diluting Disparate Impact]. See also McGinley, supra note 30; Ann C. 
McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 443 (2010). 
68. See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
69. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 564.
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
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attempt to assure that the test was fair and job related.72 IOS developed the sources 
of information for the written test and presented them to the chief and assistant chief 
for their approval.73 Once it received approval, IOS created the multiple choice 
questions for the written test.74 The City then opened a three-month study period 
and gave candidates a list of source materials for the questions.75 IOS also created the 
questions for the oral portion of the test and trained assessors to assure consistency 
and accuracy in judging the oral section.76 Minorities were overrepresented in the 
group of selected oral assessors, who sat in panels of three.77 Despite these efforts, 
the final test results (a combination of written and oral) were surprising and 
unfortunate.78 Even though a number of black and Hispanic firefighters took and 
passed the test, no blacks and only two Hispanic firefighters scored highly enough 
on the test to be eligible for the first wave of promotions.79
 This result occurred in part because of two policies the City used in determining 
how to score the test and how to employ its test results. First, the City considered 
itself bound by a collective bargaining agreement that weighted the written and oral 
portions of the test at 60% and 40%, respectively, a weighting that the City did not 
permit its consultant to change.80 Second, the city charter required the City to hire 
from a list that used a “rule of three.” The “rule of three” required the City to hire for 
an open position from the top three candidates. Before January 2004, the City had 
interpreted this provision to permit banding (rounding the test scores to the next 
integer) to comply with the “rule of three.”81 This was done because it was considered 
inaccurate to conclude that there was a difference of quality between the minute 
score differences. According to the banding method, if three persons earned 90.9, 
90.8, and 90.7, all would be rounded up to 91 and would be grouped in a single 
“band.” The “rule of three” would permit consideration of all persons within that 
72. Id. at 565.
73. Id.
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. at 565–66.
78. There was no dispute that the test (combined with the City’s rules regarding its use) had a racially 
adverse impact. On the captain’s exam, whites passed at a rate of 64%, while blacks and Hispanics 
passed at a rate of 37.5%. On the lieutenant’s exam, the white pass rate was 58.1% while the black pass 
rate was 31.6% and the Hispanic pass rate was 20%. These rates easily meet the standard the EEOC has 
set for determining whether a disparate impact exists. According to the EEOC, a disparate impact 
exists if the selection rate is less than 80% of the rate for the group with the highest rate. See id. at 
586–87 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2008)).
79. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 566.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 140–42.
81. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 590 (citing Kelly v. City of New Haven, No. CV000444614, 2004 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 68, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2004)).
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band and the next two highest bands.82 Using this method yielded more persons of 
color eligible for promotion. The resulting list would be used for two years and 
during that time persons earning scores in the top three bands would be considered 
for each promotion.
 In January 2004, however, a Connecticut state court issued an injunction that 
prohibited the City from using this method. Instead of banding, each candidate 
would be listed individually by score, no matter how minute and statistically 
insignificant the differences among the scores, and only the three top-scoring 
candidates—rather than all candidates within the top three bands—would be 
considered for the open position.83 At the time the 2003 test results were announced, 
there were eight open lieutenant positions and seven open captain positions. For the 
lieutenant jobs, ten candidates were eligible for promotion to fill the eight open 
positions: all were white. For the captain jobs, nine candidates were eligible for 
promotion to fill the seven open positions: seven were white and two were Hispanics. 
In total, no blacks and only two Hispanics were eligible out of the twenty-seven 
blacks and twenty-three Hispanics who took the test.84 Insofar as diversity of 
candidates for promotions was concerned, these results were significantly worse than 
those attained in earlier years.85
 These test results exacerbated the New Haven Fire Department’s history of 
unequal treatment of minorities. In 1972 the Civil Rights Act was amended to ban 
discrimination in public employment.86 At the time, approximately 4% of New 
Haven firefighters were black and none was Hispanic, even though minorities 
represented approximately 30% of the City’s population.87 Groups of minorities sued 
the New Haven Fire Department, alleging illegal race discrimination in hiring.88
 The percentages of minority men in the fire department have improved 
significantly since 1973, but there is still considerable underrepresentation of blacks 
82. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 590.
83. See Kelly, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 68, at *2–4. For a description of this process, see Respondents’ 
Brief on the Merits at 4–5, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328), 2009 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 232, at *12–14.
84. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. Conn. 2006).
85. In the lieutenant test given in 1996, African Americans scored in rank #3, and Hispanics scored in rank 
#4. In 1999, African Americans appeared in rank #5, and Hispanics in rank #1. In contrast, in 2003, on 
the lieutenant’s exam that was in question in Ricci, the highest ranking for African Americans was #13, 
and the highest ranking for Hispanics was #26. See Joint Appendix at 21–23, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 222, at *9–10. For the captain’s 
exam, in 1999, the highest African Americans appeared in rank #5, and the highest Hispanic in rank 
#4. In 2003, in contrast, the highest African American ranked #15 in the captain’s test, and the highest 
Hispanic ranked #6. Id. at 23.
86. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)). 
87. Nicole Allen & Emily Bazelon, The Ladder: Part 4: Is There a Better Way to Decide Who Gets Promoted?, 
Slate (June 25, 2009, 7:17 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
features/2009/the_ladder/part_4_is_there_a_better_way_to_decide_who_gets_promoted.html.
88. See Firebird Soc’y of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 66 F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn. 1975).
879
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
at the higher ranks and of Hispanics in both firefighter and upper level positions. As 
of late 2009, while 37% of New Haven’s population is black, approximately 30% of 
the firefighters, 22% of the lieutenants, and 4% of the captains are black.89 Twenty-
six percent of the New Haven population is Hispanic; 13% of firefighters, 14% of 
lieutenants, and 16% of captains are Hispanic.90 These numbers demonstrate the 
difficulties the City has had in promoting blacks and in hiring and promoting 
Hispanics proportional to their representation in the City itself.
 When the 2003 test results were released, city leaders and Corporation Counsel 
Thomas Ude expressed concern that the test had an illegal disparate impact on 
blacks and Hispanics.91 The city charter gives the Civil Service Board (CSB) 
responsibility to certify the exam results. Without certification, the results cannot be 
used. Upon receipt of the exam results, the CSB held five public hearings92 and took 
testimony from various sources, but it ultimately failed to certify the results.93
 Seventeen non-Hispanic white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter who sat 
for the promotional exams sued, alleging that the City violated Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution when it threw out the exam results.94 The plaintiffs alleged 
that because the City’s decision to throw out the test results was based on the race of 
the test-takers who were most successful (white),95 the City had engaged in intentional 
race discrimination against the white candidates who did well on the exam.96
 The plaintiffs argued that it is always impermissible under Title VII’s prohibition 
of disparate treatment to make race-based decisions to avoid disparate impact liability 
even when the employer knows the practices violate Title VII’s disparate impact 
clause.97 In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that an employer is liable for disparate 
treatment when it uses race-conscious remedies unless it proves that it would be liable 
for a disparate impact violation if it did not use the remedy of discarding the test 
results.98 In contrast, defendants argued that an employer’s good faith belief that its 
89. See Chart provided by Victor Bolden, Corp. Counsel, City of New Haven (Dec. 9, 2009) (on file with author).
90. Id. 
91. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. Conn. 2006).
92. Id. at 145–50.
93. See id. at 150. The vote was actually a tie, resulting in non-certification. Id.
94. Id. at 144. The plaintiffs also alleged that the City violated the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, engaged in conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and sought 
damages for intentional inf liction of emotional distress. Id. Those claims, however, will not be addressed 
in this paper.
95. See id. 
96. See id. at 151.
97. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579–80 (2009).
98. See id. The plaintiffs also argued a more nefarious motive on the City’s part. It argued that the City was 
pressured by a black minister who used significant political power to inf luence the City to throw out the 
results. While this second version of the events leading to the rejection of the results is not credited by 
the majority opinion, Justice Alito’s concurrence takes it as fact. See id. at 598 (Alito, J., concurring).
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remedial actions are necessary to avoid disparate impact liability justifies race-conscious 
conduct.99 The federal district court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ arguments and 
granted the City’s motion for summary judgment,100 and the Second Circuit panel 
affirmed summarily.101 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
 In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a good faith belief 
that the testing created an illegal disparate impact on racial minorities is insufficient 
as a defense to a disparate treatment claim that arose as a result of the City’s overt 
use of race to throw out the test results.102 Instead, over a strong dissent,103 a majority 
of the Court concluded that the City must have “a strong basis in evidence that, had 
it” certified the results, “it would have been liable under [Title VII] disparate-
impact” theory.104 Moreover, the majority concluded as a matter of law that the 
defendants did not meet the necessary threshold standard.105
 Never before had the Supreme Court held that disparate treatment was more 
important than disparate impact under Title VII. In Ricci, however, the majority 
appeared to view individual, intentional discrimination as the principle evil that 
Congress sought to prevent.106 This position ignored Congress’s passage of the 1991 
Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, specifically to codify a disparate impact cause 
99. See id. at 581.
100. 554 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
101. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008). In a per curiam opinion, the Second Circuit panel 
stated in part:
In this case, the Civil Service Board found itself in the unfortunate position of having 
no good alternatives. We are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs’ expression of 
frustration. Mr. Ricci, for example, who is dyslexic, made intensive efforts that appear 
to have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams, only to have it invalidated. 
But it simply does not follow that he has a viable Title VII claim. To the contrary, 
because the Board, in refusing to validate the exams, was simply trying to fulfill its 
obligations under Title VII when confronted with test results that had a disproportionate 
racial impact, its actions were protected. 
 Id. at 87. Ultimately, the Second Circuit voted not to hear the case en banc. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008).
102. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 560. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion with Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joining the decision. There were also two concurrences; Justice 
Scalia wrote one concurrence in which Justice Alito joined and Justice Alito filed a concurrence in 
which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. See id.
103. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the dissent with Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joining the 
opinion. See id.
104. Id. at 563.
105. See id. at 586. The Court did not reach the question of whether the disparate impact provision violates 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 563. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia 
argued in his concurrence, joined by Justice Alito, that the disparate impact provision of Title VII 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 594–96 (Scalia, J., concurring). For an interesting 
discussion of this issue, see generally Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1341 (2010).
106. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577.
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of action to give the provision a broader reading than was recognized at the time by 
the Supreme Court.107
 But the Supreme Court also relied on a provision of the 1991 Act to reach its 
desired result in Ricci. The provision, section 703(l), makes it unlawful to adjust 
scoring or to alter test results on the basis of race.108 It prohibits “race-norming,” or 
using different cut-off scores based on race; it says nothing about prohibiting an 
employer from throwing out a test altogether that produces a disparate result. The 
plaintiffs never raised the issue of race-norming before the federal district court; the 
court of appeals never discussed the issue, and lower courts had never discussed this 
possible interpretation of the provision.109 Nonetheless, with virtually no analysis, 
the majority concluded that this section governed and prohibited the defendant from 
throwing out the test results, from using a weighting system other than the sixty/
forty system for written and oral exams, and from using banding, an alternative to 
the “rule of three” that would have allowed for the promotion of a number of blacks 
and Hispanics.110 In essence, the majority used the anti-race-norming provision to 
severely restrict or eliminate the less discriminatory alternatives that otherwise would 
have been available to the defendants. This was an odd interpretation given that the 
anti-race-norming provision barred the use of different cutoffs by race in scoring a 
particular test. It did not deal at all with what the City of New Haven did here: 
throw out the test for everyone because of its belief that it created an illegal disparate 
impact on blacks and Hispanics.
 The majority decision significantly restricted the disparate impact cause of action 
in Ricci. More important for purposes of this article, the Court achieved this change 
in the law by openly distorting the summary judgment rules. Ricci displays a majority 
of the Supreme Court reaching out to grant summary judgment to the petitioners 
and, in apparent contravention of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
weighing the credibility of witnesses and drawing inferences in favor of the moving 
party. In granting summary judgment to petitioners in Ricci rather than remanding 
the case for fact finding, the Supreme Court majority openly relied on Scott v. Harris 
and concluded, using language from Scott v. Harris, that the “City’s assertions . . . are 
‘blatantly contradicted by the record.’”111 This language is particularly startling not 
only because four Justices and a number of judges below did not agree, but also 
because it signaled that Scott would not be limited to cases where a videotape existed 
in the record to give the judges a bird’s-eye view of the facts.
 In Ricci, although there was uncontested evidence that the test was not created 
with intent to discriminate, that showing is irrelevant in a disparate impact cause of 
107. See McGinley, Diluting Disparate Impact, supra note 67, at 630–31.
108. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 106, § 703(l), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2006)).
109. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 20, Ricci v. DeStefano, 
557 U.S. 557 (2009) (No. 07-1428), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 153, at *35.
110. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 589–90.
111. Id. at 587–88 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
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action where intent is not at issue. There was, however, in Ricci conflicting testimony 
of firefighters who took the test regarding its applicability to the New Haven Fire 
Department’s procedures and evidence that the study materials were more available 
to some firefighters than others. Most importantly, there was also testimony from an 
expert with twenty-five years of experience in designing tests that the City should 
have used an internal review process to assure the validity of the test and that there 
were alternatives that would have created less of a disparate impact. All of this 
testimony created questions of fact as to whether there was a strong basis in evidence 
that the City’s test was job related and consistent with business necessity, and whether 
less discriminatory alternatives were available. In this context, the majority’s decision 
that the plaintiffs merited summary judgment plays havoc with the understanding 
that summary judgment should be granted only where no reasonable person can 
conclude, given the evidence, that the non-moving party should prevail. It would 
have been reasonable for a jury to conclude that the City had proved that there was a 
strong basis in evidence that it would be liable for disparate impact if it had not 
thrown out the test results. Given the controversial and extremely political nature of 
the underlying case in Ricci, the Supreme Court’s decision not to permit the process 
to work makes one wonder what was occurring behind the scenes. Giving the Justices 
the benefit of the doubt concerning their motives, there is still a serious question as 
to whether the Court’s grant of summary judgment to the firefighters resulted from 
an unconscious inf luence of their cultural groups on their perceptions of legally 
consequential facts. The next subpart discusses in detail the procedural problems 
with the Ricci decision.
 B. Ricci’s Long Trail of Procedural Mishaps
  1. Procedural Background and Substantive Disparate Impact Law
 As noted above, the federal district court had granted summary judgment to the 
City and city officials as defendants in the case alleging discrimination based on a 
disparate treatment theory. The lower courts rejected the plaintiffs’ theory that taking 
the race of successful candidates into account in determining whether to certify the 
test itself is a form of discrimination.112 Given that there was undisputed evidence that 
the test created a disparate impact on racial minorities in the fire department, and 
that the remedy itself was race-neutral, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
evidence was insufficient to create a question of fact. The trial court reached this 
result despite the plaintiffs’ arguments that the defendants were motivated by political 
pressure imposed on the mayor by a powerful African American preacher.113 The trial 
court noted that the firefighters had no legal right to the promotion because the CSB 
had not yet voted to certify the results, and even once certified, the “rule of three” 
would affect the order in which promotions would be granted.114 The trial court 
112. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006), aff ’d, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008).
113. See Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d. at 150–51.
114. See id. at 159–60.
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stated, “Defendants’ motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a 
racially disparate impact, even in a political context, does not, as a matter of law, 
constitute discriminatory intent, and therefore such evidence is insufficient for 
plaintiffs to prevail on their Title VII claim.”115
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarily affirmed the lower 
court’s holding and eventually adopted the reasoning of the trial court. One of the 
judges on the Second Circuit asked for an en banc hearing. While the case did not 
receive sufficient votes for an en banc rehearing, a number of judges wrote dissenting 
opinions on the refusal to grant the rehearing. The dissent of Judge José Cabranes 
argued that there were questions of fact concerning the motivation of the defendant, 
the City, when it threw out the tests. Putting the factual questions aside, Judge 
Cabranes, with five other judges joining his opinion, also raised questions about the 
proper tests under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII to determine when it is 
permissible to throw out test results based on the success of a particular racial group.116
 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. First, the Supreme Court agreed with 
the plaintiffs that a defendant can be liable for race discrimination under disparate 
treatment theory even though the defendant intended to prevent a disparate impact 
lawsuit. Second, the Court rejected the standards that the plaintiffs and the defendants 
argued should apply in determining whether an employer may take race into account in 
order to avoid disparate impact liability. Instead, it established a new test—the “strong 
basis in evidence” test, drawn from Equal Protection doctrine—to determine whether 
a defendant employer should be liable in throwing out test results.117
 Ordinarily when the Supreme Court announces a new standard to evaluate the 
evidence, it remands the case to the lower court to consider the evidence in light of the 
new standard.118 Rather than remanding the case for the lower court to apply the new 
legal standard, however, the majority of the Court overturned the lower court’s grant 
of summary judgment to the defendants and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.
 The substantive and procedural law is so inextricably intertwined in Ricci that 
understanding the importance of the procedure the Supreme Court employed 
requires a review of substantive disparate impact law. In a disparate impact case, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant’s policy or practice created a 
disparate impact on a protected group. This proof shifts the burden to the defendant 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the policy is job related and 
consistent with business necessity. If the defendant cannot meet this proof 
requirement, the plaintiff wins the case. If the defendant establishes that the policy 
is job related and consistent with business necessity, the burden of persuasion shifts 
115. Id. at 160 (footnote omitted).
116. Ricci, 530 F.3d at 93 (Cabranes, J., dissenting).
117. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582 (2009).
118. See id. at 631 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005)); Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982)); see also Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 201 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (“Unusually, the Court reversed the challenged judgment rather than vacating it, which 
prevented the city from adducing evidence to satisfy the newly imposed ‘strong basis’ standard.”).
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back to the plaintiff to prove that there is a less discriminatory alternative practice 
that the defendant refuses to adopt.119 If the plaintiff meets this proof, the plaintiff 
wins the case.
 In Ricci, however, because the defendants were defending a decision to throw out 
test results, the majority decision placed the burden of persuasion of all of the 
elements on the defendants, in essence requiring the defendants to speak for the 
absent minority plaintiffs who presumably would have sued the City had it certified 
the results. This test comes close to asking the defendants to prove their own 
culpability.120 Under the “strong basis in evidence” test, the defendants have to prove: 
(1) the existence of a disparate impact caused by the defendants’ policy;121 (2) that 
there was a strong basis in evidence to conclude that the promotional process was not 
job related and consistent with business necessity; or, in the alternative, (3) that there 
was insufficient evidence to dispute that the test was job related and consistent with 
business necessity, or that there was a strong basis in the evidence to conclude that 
there was a less discriminatory and equally valid alternative that the employer refused 
to adopt. Because the plaintiffs did not dispute that the test caused a disparate impact 
on black and Hispanic firefighters, the discussion focused on proof of job relatedness 
and less discriminatory alternative practices.
 For purposes of this discussion, I will accept without criticism122 that the 
majority’s conclusion that the employer’s use of a race-conscious remedy can violate 
Title VII and that “strong basis in evidence” is the proper test in determining whether 
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006). 
(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under 
this title only if —
  (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment 
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice 
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
  (ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph 
(C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses 
to adopt such alternative employment practice.
 Id. Subparagraph (C) states: “The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in 
accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of ‘alternative 
employment practice.’” Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C).
120. In a comparable situation, where the employer asserts that it has considered race in hiring or promotion 
pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the affirmative 
action plan is not valid. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987). It remains unclear 
whether Ricci will be interpreted to overturn the affirmative action cases.
121. Because it was undisputed in Ricci that there was a disparate impact caused by the test, see Ricci, 557 
U.S. at 586–87, it is somewhat unclear whether the defendant would have to prove that there is a strong 
basis in evidence that there was a disparate impact and that the defendant’s test caused it or whether the 
defendant would have to prove that the test caused a disparate impact by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The Court did not discuss this issue.
122. For a critique of these decisions, see supra note 28, and McGinley, Diluting Disparate Impact, supra note 
67. See also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 627 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s “strong basis in 
evidence” standard as an erroneous application of equal protection precedents).
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a violation occurs. Given this caveat, the Court properly overturned the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because a reasonable jury, based on 
the evidence in this case, could conclude either that the test was job related or not, or 
that there were or were not less discriminatory alternatives, especially in light of the 
defendants’ burden of persuasion on all elements, the majority of the Court voted 
properly to overturn the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant.123 
 It is the Court’s next step with which I take issue. The majority granted summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the moving party. Given the evidence in the 
record, this summary judgment grant is improvident. This ruling determines that, as 
a matter of law, there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder 
could have concluded that: (1) there was strong evidence that the test was not job 
related or consistent with business necessity; and (2) there was strong evidence that 
alternative less discriminatory testing mechanisms existed.
 Given the substantial evidence showing that black and Hispanic plaintiffs could 
have prevailed on a disparate impact claim against the City if it had certified the test, 
this ruling seems to defy both disparate impact law and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Ricci at once revised disparate impact law and summary judgment 
law, at least when applied in the Title VII disparate impact context. The next 
subsection analyzes the evidence that was before the Supreme Court when it granted 
summary judgment to the plaintiffs.
  2. The Court’s Analysis of the Evidence in Ricci
 Had the Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court because of the new 
legal standard, in all likelihood the parties would have requested more time for 
discovery so that they could develop their evidence in preparation for a renewed 
motion for summary judgment by the plaintiffs and/or for trial. It is likely that the 
123. While it supported the defendants’ position in the litigation, the U.S. Solicitor General agreed that the 
lower court’s grant of summary judgment should be overturned and the case remanded. Employing the 
well-known construct of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the United States 
argued that evidence that a test creates a disparate impact is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 
the employer’s action of refusing to use the test. This proof would shift the burden of persuasion back to 
the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s reason is pretextual. The plaintiff could prove pretext by 
demonstrating that the employer’s “proffered motive of compliance is unreasonable.” See Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand, supra note 109, at 17–18. Use of the 
McDonnell Douglas test would be a bit odd, however, because that test is ordinarily used when the 
plaintiff seeks to prove by inference that he or she suffered a discriminatory employment action. It does 
not ordinarily apply where the defendant agrees that it has made an employment decision on the basis of 
race. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (“A prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise 
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.”); Angela 
Anwuachi-Willig, When Different Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White 
Plaintiffs under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 53, 65 (1999) 
(“In other words, the sole purpose of the McDonnell Douglas test is to answer one simple question: can 
unlawful discrimination against a plaintiff be inferred from the circumstances?”); McGinley, supra note 
1, at 212 (“Where direct evidence is lacking, the courts employ a burden-shifting approach first 
recognized in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.”). Here, the plaintiffs argued that refusal to use the 
test results was racial discrimination on its face. 
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firefighter-plaintiffs would have sought to depose a number of the witnesses whose 
testimony before the CSB was favorable to the defendants. The City defendants may 
have wished to hire Dr. Christopher Hornick, an assessment expert with twenty-five 
years of experience, who criticized the test at the CSB hearing. Dr. Hornick would 
have served as the City’s expert witness who would evaluate whether the test created 
by IOS was job related and consistent with business necessity, and whether there 
existed less discriminatory alternatives. The plaintiffs and defendants would likely 
have deposed the firefighters who testified before the CSB about various problems 
concerning the exams. None of this happened because of the majority’s failure to 
remand the case.
 Earlier, when the case was originally brought and the defendants filed a motion 
for summary judgment before the trial court, defendants attempted to use the 
testimony of Dr. Hornick before the CSB to support their defense that they were 
acting in good faith to prevent disparate impact liability. The plaintiffs objected that 
Dr. Hornick’s CSB testimony was inadmissible hearsay that could not be used to 
support defendants’ case. The trial court judge concluded that because the defendants 
were using the testimony merely to show the defendants’ good faith in throwing out 
the test results, and not for the purpose of proving the truth of the matters asserted, 
defendants could rely on the testimony.124 But once the majority of the Supreme 
Court had announced a new legal standard, the defendants needed to use that 
testimony to meet their new burden of proving that there was a strong basis in 
evidence to conclude that, had they not thrown out the test results, the City would 
have been liable for a disparate impact claim brought by minority candidates. The 
majority of the Court did not rest its conclusion that defendants could not meet this 
burden on the argument that Dr. Hornick’s CSB testimony was unsworn hearsay. 
This would have been a thin reed because the Court concluded twenty-five years 
ago, in Celotex, that if the supportive facts were presented and could be converted 
into an affidavit or other non-hearsay testimony, they were sufficient on a motion for 
summary judgment.125
 Instead of attacking the testimony as hearsay, which would have raised protests 
that the defendants had been given no opportunity to convert the testimony into 
deposition testimony or affidavits, the majority opinion simply ridiculed the 
testimony as thin and insufficient to support defendants’ burden of proof. In doing 
so, the Court drew inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, the moving party, and even 
speculated about Dr. Hornick’s motives for testifying.
 At the CSB hearings, there was testimony from a number of witnesses. First, the 
vice president of IOS, the consulting firm, testified about the manner in which his 
company created the multiple choice exams and the oral panels. This testimony, 
which was not controverted, appeared to raise no question that IOS took care to 
avoid racial bias when it created its tests.126 There was also testimony before the CSB 
124. Ricci v. Destefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 148 n.4 (D. Conn. 2006).
125. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
126. For a description of IOS’s preparation of the test, see supra text accompanying notes 70–80.
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by Dr. Hornick and by firefighters from the department and another nearby 
department that, in my view, created issues of fact as to whether the test was job 
related and consistent with business necessity and whether there were equally valid, 
less discriminatory alternatives.
 The firefighters’ testimony alone was mixed and, standing alone, may have 
created questions of fact. A number of firefighters supported the test, testifying that 
it was fair and the questions were relevant. In fact, the firefighters’ union supported 
certification of the test results. Other firefighters, however, testified that many of 
the questions were not relevant to how the fire department in New Haven operated. 
They also testified that the test contained outdated materials.127 They stated that 
many of the study materials contained contradictory information,128 and that some of 
the information came from the New York Fire Department, not the New Haven Fire 
Department.129 They also raised questions about the information that some 
firefighters had that others did not possess. A number stated that some firefighters 
had copies of study materials even before the syllabus came out, but that others had 
no access to those materials because they did not have relatives or friends who 
preceded them in the fire department.130 A few stated that once they received notice 
of the availability of the materials they needed, they ordered the materials, which 
took a significant amount of time to arrive. One firefighter testified that he waited 
one and one-half months for the books to arrive.131 Some testified that the books 
comprised 1200 pages of reading and that they were expensive.132 Some suggested 
that some firefighters seemed to have inside information about what was or was not 
going to be on the test. Evidently, a book entitled The Essentials of Fire Fighting was 
at the fire department, but some members of the department announced that they 
were told that the Essentials materials were not on the test.133
 The allegations of differential access to materials are particularly important to 
the issue of race because of the history of the New Haven Fire Department. The 
New Haven Fire Department was historically white and ethnic, mostly Irish and 
Italian.134 As in most fire departments across the country, selection for firefighting 
jobs depended in large part on nepotism and cronyism.135 If it is true that the fire 
127. See Joint Appendix, supra note 85, at 44, 50.
128. Id. at 44.
129. Id. at 49.
130. Id. at 43, 49, 51, 68–69, 71.
131. Id. at 69.
132. Id. at 49, 51.
133. Id. at 69.
134. See Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City 41 (2d ed. 
2005); James S. Olson & Heather Olson Beal, The Ethnic Dimension in American History 
128 (2010); Samuel Koenig, Ethnic Factors in the Economic Life of Urban Connecticut, 8 Am. Soc. Rev. 
193, 195 (1943); McGinley, supra note 30, at 588–89. 
135. See Jay Lowry, Does Nepotism Hurt the Fire Service?, 156 Fire Engineering 186, 186 (Oct. 2003) (“‘It is 
the family business’ . . . or so goes the saying for many firefighters. Since the dawn of the American fire 
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department members who had fathers or other relatives in the department had earlier 
and/or better access to materials (because their relatives owned some of the source 
books that were difficult and/or expensive for others to obtain), this improved access 
would disproportionately benefit white firefighters whose families had histories in 
the department. Blacks and Hispanics, in contrast to many of the white firefighters, 
were relative newcomers to the department.
 An African American firefighter who represented the African American firefighters’ 
union explained that the City of Bridgeport, which is located near New Haven and has 
a similar population, has a much higher percentage of African Americans and Hispanics 
in lieutenant and captain positions in its fire department. He attributed the diversity in 
the Bridgeport department to a change in the weighting system between the written 
and oral tests,136 a change that weighted the oral tests significantly more than the written 
tests. This weighting contrasts with the greater, sixty/forty weight given to the written/
oral portions of the test by the City of New Haven.
 A former Michigan firefighter and fire program specialist from the Department 
of Homeland Security, Vincent Lewis, testified that he believed that generally the 
candidates should know the materials and that “the questions were relevant.”137 But 
even he commented that firefighters who had experience driving a fire truck would 
have a significant advantage on the lieutenant test. He agreed that the test appeared 
to be a good test, but he conditioned his testimony on proof (that he did not have) 
that the candidates would have had equal training and access to study materials.138
 But it was Dr. Hornick’s testimony that was key to the defense and, in my view—
combined with the firefighters’ testimony—created genuine issues of fact. Dr. 
Hornick demonstrated considerable expertise because of his twenty-five years of 
experience in the very type of testing at issue in Ricci and because he had served as an 
expert witness in litigation on both sides of the issue. He explained that he had 
testified on behalf of cities defending tests and on behalf of the U.S. Department of 
Justice when it brought suits against cities and counties alleging that their assessments 
were discriminatory.139 Acknowledging that most tests have some disparate impact 
on minorities, Dr. Hornick noted that the 2003 New Haven test had a surprising 
and relatively high adverse impact that was worse than the typical adverse impact 
found in most tests. Explaining that he had not had time to study the test extensively, 
Dr. Hornick focused on the procedures used to assure that the test was job related. 
He explained that because the City had decided not to have anyone who worked for 
service, families have played a tremendous role in staffing fire stations around the country.”); Girardeau 
A. Spann, Postracial Discrimination, The Modern Am., Spring 2009, at 26, 31 (“Firefighting in general 
was associated with a long legacy of racial discrimination . . . . Employment decisions often abandoned 
merit in favor of nepotism or political patronage, thereby entrenching preexisting racial hierarchies. 
New Haven illustrated the problem.”)
136. See Joint Appendix, supra note 85, at 66.
137. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 571 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. See Joint Appendix, supra note 85, at 113, 115.
139. Id. at 90. The remaining Hornick testimony appears in the Joint Appendix. Id. at 88–108.
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the City see the test beforehand, the test lacked the internal check necessary to assure 
that all of the questions were relevant. In contrast with the method used by IOS, he 
testified that he ordinarily hires a panel of subject matter experts from within the 
department, who are sworn to confidentiality, to review the questions before the test 
is used. This procedure assures that the test questions are relevant to the department 
and avoids the problems that were identified by various New Haven firefighters—
that many of the questions were confusing and not relevant to firefighting in New 
Haven. The New Haven test never underwent an internal review before being used. 
Instead, IOS merely used someone from Atlanta, Georgia, who was not familiar 
with New Haven procedures, to review the test.
 Dr. Hornick also testified that the sixty/forty weighting could be responsible for 
some of the adverse effects and that a multiple choice test was not the best way to 
select the most qualified persons for promotions to the relevant positions. A multiple 
choice test, according to Dr. Hornick, merely measures whether a candidate can 
memorize answers, but does not assess whether he or she can apply knowledge to a 
situation. He mentioned that assessment centers and situational judgment tests, on 
the other hand, demonstrate how a candidate is able to apply knowledge to a 
particular situation.140 For the lieutenant and captain jobs, he identified five key sets 
of skills that should be tested and that assessment centers can test accurately: 
leadership, command presence, interpersonal skills, management skills, and technical 
skills. He concluded that there are much better ways to test these skill sets than a 
short oral panel and a multiple choice test.
 Chad Legal, the vice president of IOS, testified that the City hired his company to 
create a written multiple choice test and tests for the oral panels. He testified that he 
was bound by the sixty/forty percent weighting and never discussed the weighting with 
the City; the City did not ask him to consider an assessment center. Nor did he create 
a test that could evaluate “command presence,” a quality that an assessment center 
would measure more effectively than written and oral tests.141 While this testimony 
may have demonstrated IOS’s lack of culpability for producing an ineffective test, it 
actually could be read by a reasonable jury to support Dr. Hornick’s testimony because 
it demonstrates that the consultant, whose expertise was used to create the test, had his 
hands tied to a certain extent when it came to creating the assessment. It also creates a 
question of fact concerning the importance of “command presence” as a quality that is 
related to the jobs in question and whether a test that does not measure command 
presence is job related and consistent with business necessity.
 Dr. Hornick’s testimony creates three major issues of fact concerning the test. 
First, he questioned the validity and accuracy of a test that had no internal review 
before the test was given to candidates. Second, he testified that a different weighting 
of the written and oral tests would have allowed the City to consider two black 
candidates for the lieutenant positions and another for the captain positions. Third, 
he stated that an assessment center process is a better method to select the best 
140. See id. at 102–03.
141. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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candidates for these types of positions. The majority of the Court treated Dr. 
Hornick’s testimony with not-so-veiled disdain. As to the first issue, the majority 
ignored Dr. Hornick’s criticism that the test had no internal checks to assure the 
validity of the subject matter. It acknowledged that some firefighters testified that 
the materials were contradictory and that some of the questions did not specifically 
apply to firefighting practices in New Haven, but it credited the testimony of IOS 
Vice President Legal that IOS had addressed a “handful” of those concerns, and that 
it had thrown out at least one question as a result of the criticisms.142 But Mr. Legal’s 
testimony was not directly responsive to the many criticisms launched by firefighters 
and reinforced by Dr. Hornick’s assessment of the proper procedures to establish 
internal controls. The Court chose to credit Mr. Legal’s testimony over that of the 
firefighters and Dr. Hornick—a choice that should be left to the fact finder.
 Regarding the second issue, as to the weighting of the written and oral scores, 
the Court merely noted that the City had not demonstrated that the formula was 
“arbitrary.” In fact, the Court continued, because the formula resulted from an 
agreement negotiated with the union, it “presume[d]” that the negotiation existed for 
a rational reason.143 This is a very odd discussion. First, nowhere in the majority 
opinion does it say that, in order to find that a test is not job related or consistent 
with business necessity, the defendant has to prove that it is “arbitrary.” Perhaps even 
more important, even if a showing of arbitrariness is necessary to demonstrate that it 
is “not job related,” that is not the proper test for determining whether a less 
discriminatory alternative exists. Even without a showing of arbitrariness, the 
testimony about the differential weighting is important to establish a less 
discriminatory and equally valid alternative. Dr. Hornick’s testimony, moreover, was 
bolstered by the testimony of Donald Day of the International Association of Black 
Professional Firefighters, who testified about the experience of the City of Bridgeport, 
Connecticut. This testimony revealed that Bridgeport, a nearby city with similar 
demographics to New Haven’s, had adopted a different weighting system that had 
led to the selection of a more diverse group of officers in its fire department.
 Perhaps most important, the Court’s presumption that the weighting negotiated by 
the union in the mid-1980s was rational is surprisingly naïve. There are numerous 
cases where both employers and unions were sued for reaching agreements that 
discriminated against applicants and employees because of race. Thus, to presume that 
the agreement was not discriminatory or that there was no less discriminatory weighting 
system because of the union’s involvement seems nonsensical. This presumption is 
particularly problematic because of the procedural posture of the case. By engaging in 
the presumption, the majority of the Court drew an inference directly in favor of the 
plaintiffs, the moving party on the motion for summary judgment.
 Further, the majority of the Court supported its conclusion about weighting by 
resorting to section 2000e-2(l), the race-norming prohibition, and stated that 
142. See id. at 588.
143. Id.
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changing the weighting formula “could well have”144 violated the statute. Once again, 
this is an odd use of Title VII. Race-norming is prohibited because it is a practice of 
grading people of different races according to different standards. Thus, with race-
norming, a black candidate might pass an exam with a score of sixty-five whereas a 
white candidate might need a seventy in order to pass the exam. The suggested 
weighting in Ricci, however, applies the same standard to all candidates of all races, 
but places more emphasis on one form of testing over another. Moreover, the evidence 
about the weighting formula did not suggest that the City was considering changing 
the weighting on this particular test. Rather, the evidence was presented to 
demonstrate that a less discriminatory alternative to this particular test existed and 
that the defendants could have used this alternative in designing the test.
 Third, the Court breezed lightly by Dr. Hornick’s testimony about assessment 
centers. It concluded that Dr. Hornick’s “brief mention of alternative testing methods, 
standing alone, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that assessment centers 
were available to the City at the time of the examinations and that they would have 
produced less adverse impact.”145 It referred to other “statements” to the CSB 
indicating that the City could not have used an assessment center process for the 
2003 examinations.146 But the “statements” the majority opinion cites to is one 
comment by plaintiff Frank Ricci, who admitted in his testimony that assessment 
centers show less adverse impact in some cases, but argued that an assessment center 
was not available in New Haven because it would have taken years to develop a 
protocol and training to go with it.147 There is no evidence that Ricci is an expert on 
the use of assessment centers or the development of training and protocols. Moreover, 
countering Ricci’s testimony, a reasonable person could interpret Dr. Hornick’s 
testimony as asserting that assessment centers are already in use in other cities across 
the country and that there is no reason to believe that the creation of these centers 
would have taken more time than the creation of the test by IOS. In fact, Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter, explained that a 
1996 study found that nearly two-thirds of municipalities surveyed used assessment 
centers as part of the promotion processes.148 This fact strongly suggests that 
assessment centers were available as test methods to the City of New Haven. But as 
to the question of availability, the Court was vague, and had the case been remanded 
for more factual development, enlightenment on this subject would have been useful. 
Defendants originally used Dr. Hornick’s testimony to demonstrate their subjective 
good faith belief that they would lose a disparate impact cause of action if they used 
the test. However, the Court faulted them for not developing the evidence under a 
stricter standard. Given that the procedural posture is the plaintiffs’ motion for 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 591.
146. Id. 
147. See id. at 572–74.
148. See id. at 634–35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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summary judgment, the Court’s refusal to draw inferences created by the testimony 
before the CSB in favor of the non-moving party—the defendant City—is troubling.
 The majority opinion is particularly dismissive of Dr. Hornick. Drawing an 
inference in favor of the plaintiffs, the Court pointed out that Dr. Hornick was a 
direct competitor of IOS, implying that Dr. Hornick testified as he did because he 
wanted to get the City of New Haven’s business. The Court stated:
The remainder of his remarks showed that Hornick’s primary concern—
somewhat to the frustration of CSB members—was marketing his services 
for the future, not commenting on the results of the tests the City had already 
administered . . . . Hornick’s hinting had its intended effect: the City has 
since hired him as a consultant.149
 This disrespect for Dr. Hornick and his testimony is particularly stark when 
compared with the treatment of the testimony of Mr. Legal from IOS, which 
designed the test for $100,000. The majority consistently credited Mr. Legal’s 
testimony, making credibility determinations and drawing inferences that should 
have been left to the fact finder, while raising questions about Dr. Hornick’s 
motivations. Mr. Legal, however, had just as much (if not more) of an interest in 
convincing the Court of the validity of the tests as Dr. Hornick had in demonstrating 
their invalidity, but the Court never acknowledged that Mr. Legal had a vested 
interest in the test’s validity.
 In addition, the majority concluded that “the essence of Hornick’s remarks 
supported  .  .  .  certifying the test results.”150 This characterization is strange, given 
the character assessment that the Court engaged in with reference to Dr. Hornick. If 
Dr. Hornick’s motivation was to gain favor with the City in order to market his 
business, one would ask why the “essence” of his remarks should be credited at all. 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, while Dr. Hornick did not outright 
condemn IOS’s test, a reasonable jury could conclude that he attempted not to slander 
IOS precisely because it is his competitor. He revealed early on in his testimony that 
IOS is a direct competitor and he noted that he did not want to “accuse” or “attack” 
IOS.151 But it certainly appears that a reasonable fact finder could view his testimony 
as critical of important aspects of the test and supportive of a finding that less 
discriminatory alternatives existed. He openly criticized the failure to have the test 
customized to the New Haven Fire Department (through the internal review 
process),152 the sixty/forty weighting system, the use of multiple choice questions and 
short oral questions, and the failure to use an assessment process that permits test 
takers to apply their knowledge to assess key qualities in a real-life situation.
149. Id. at 591–92.
150. Id. at 591. 
151. Joint Appendix, supra note 85, at 93.
152. See id. at 96–99.
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 Throughout the interview, the members of the CSB asked Dr. Hornick directly 
whether they should certify the test results. When pressed, Dr. Hornick seemed to 
make a political/legal assessment:
You’re darned if you do and you’re darned if you don’t. . . . I think you need to 
weigh what your values are and go with the best possible decision. . . . [P]erhaps 
the only choice you will have in the end is to certify the list as it exists . . .153
 A reasonable jury can conclude that this statement does not bear on the subject of 
his expertise—whether the test itself is job related and whether there are less 
discriminatory alternatives—but is a response related to the difficult political and 
legal situation in which the City found itself, an area about which he had no expertise 
to opine. While fact finders would be free to interpret these statements as they like, 
it seems dishonest for the Court to conclude as a matter of law that Dr. Hornick’s 
testimony did not support the defendants’ position.
 Finally, the majority opinion did not take seriously the defendants’ argument that 
another alternative was to employ banding in interpreting the “rule of three.” The Court 
noted that the City did not use banding because the state court had enjoined it from 
doing so, and the Court did not dispute the defendants’ claim that using banding would 
have made four black candidates and one Hispanic candidate eligible for lieutenant and 
captain positions.154 It even acknowledged that the state court’s prohibition of banding 
under municipal law “may not eliminate banding as a valid alternative under Title 
VII.”155 But it once again relied upon section 2000e-2(l), the anti-race-norming 
provision, concluding that the statute’s prohibition against race-norming would have 
prohibited the City from adopting banding after reviewing the exam results to make 
minority scores appear higher.156 Banding, however, is a process whereby the scores are 
grouped to eliminate slight mathematical differences that do not reflect a difference in 
quality. It can operate to the advantage of both whites and persons of color because all 
scores are banded in the same manner. Banding does not depend on the race of the test 
taker; it merely allows the City to consider more candidates for promotions—candidates 
who effectively have achieved the same scores. Therefore, it does not appear to be 
prohibited by the race-norming provision of the statute.157
153. Id. at 103.
154. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 590.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. In fact, the dissent points out that the Brief of Industrial-Organizational Psychologists as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328), 2009 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260, argues that the exams were not shown to be suitably precise to allow for strict 
rank-ordering of the candidates. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 637 n.16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A difference 
of one or two percentage points on this type of test has little meaning and bears little relationship to the 
candidate’s qualifications. Id.
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 C. Cultural Cognition and the Ricci Majority
 Given the evidence discussed here, and the evidence that could have been 
developed on remand once the parties were aware of the correct standard, it seems 
odd that the Court would grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs, concluding that 
the City’s assertions were “blatantly contradicted by the record.” This test was applied 
in Scott v. Harris in a situation where the Justices believed that their view of the facts 
was inevitable. They saw the videotape and reacted to it. Since eight of the Justices 
had the same reaction (and the ninth was Justice Stevens, who apparently linked his 
reaction to his age), their conclusion about what facts occurred was mutually 
reinforced. They likely had no knowledge of the cultural cognition research and were 
unaware that scholars would subsequently find that a significant minority would 
judge the facts in the case differently. To some extent, then, one can understand why 
the Justices decided Scott v. Harris as they did. To the eight Justices in the majority, 
the lower court’s recitation of the facts—taken in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff—made no sense. They could see what happened with their own eyes by 
viewing the tape. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff was a 
“visible fiction.”158 One would expect the Court to limit the ruling in Scott v. Harris, 
however, to situations where there was little or almost no doubt about the facts. The 
“blatantly contradicted” standard should, even in the absence of understanding 
cultural cognition, be almost impossible to meet.
 Not so. Even though Ricci is a different case with no videotape or other “easy” 
way to judge the facts, the majority of the Court applied the Scott v. Harris test. 
Moreover, in Ricci, there was significant evidence in the record that the test was not 
job related or consistent with business necessity. A number of firefighters testified 
that there were many questions on the test that were confusing, not relevant at all, 
and/or relevant only to other cities’ fire departments, but not to the New Haven Fire 
Department. Others testified that the materials were not readily available to certain 
groups (i.e., minorities) who did not have family in the department. Others claimed 
that some of the firefighters appeared to have more information about what was 
going to be on the test than did others. Dr. Hornick testified that the test should 
have had an internal review process to avoid problems of inconsistency with New 
Haven Fire Department procedures. He also testified that a multiple choice test and 
the oral panel do not test key skills for lieutenant and captain positions. This evidence 
seems to be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that there was a strong basis in 
evidence that the test was not job related or consistent with business necessity.
 Even if the jury were to find that there is not a strong basis in the evidence refuting 
job relatedness and business necessity, there was additional evidence that provided a 
strong basis in the evidence that there were equally valid, less discriminatory 
alternatives. Dr. Hornick testified that an assessment center would be a better way to 
test the skills in question, and that the sixty/forty weighting likely was responsible for 
at least some of the disparate impact. Donald Day, of the International Association of 
Black Professional Firefighters, testified that in Bridgeport there was much more 
158. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007).
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diversity at the higher ranks because of a change in the weighting of the oral and 
written portions of the tests used. Finally, there was testimony in the record that 
when the City of New Haven had used banding to interpret the “rule of three,” the 
results had produced less of an adverse impact on minorities. Indeed, the evidence 
demonstrated that if the City had banded the scores of the 2003 test, a number of 
blacks and Hispanics would have been eligible for promotion.
 Given this evidence, it is puzzling that the majority did not remand the case to 
the lower court to allow the parties to develop the facts in discovery and to present 
their evidence in motions for summary judgment and/or to a fact finder at trial. 
Solving this puzzle is particularly tricky. There is the likelihood that my own 
interpretation of the facts is affected by cultural cognition, and that I will naturally 
engage in naïve realism. As I attempt to avoid naïve realism, the answer seems to be 
that, as a scholar, I, too, must practice humility about the enterprise before me. With 
this caveat in mind, I must disclose that I have a different world view than that of the 
Justices in the majority in Ricci. I believe, and I have written, that the Ricci majority 
privileges the regulation of intentional discrimination—discriminatory treatment—
over the regulation of disparate impact. That privileging, I have argued, ignores 
history and context, and makes it easier for white men than minorities and women of 
all races to sue for discrimination.159 In essence, my criticism has been that the 
majority allowed its view of the world to infect its decision in the case. But isn’t that 
what courts always do? And, isn’t it true that the majority’s world view has merit? 
This was a difficult case, and throwing out the test was no simple matter. There 
were definitely going to be winners and losers; and deciding to throw out the results 
would have an impact on individuals, like Frank Ricci, who were not necessarily 
powerful or oppressive.
159. In another article, I state:
Ricci emphasizes an ahistorical view of discrimination. It views the only wrong as the 
defendants’ overt and conscious use of race to overturn the test results. It ignores, however, 
the defendants’ reason for doing so and the history of racial discrimination in the country 
that has led to practices and structures causing a disparate impact on persons of color. At 
the same time, the Court narrowed the definition of disparate impact. . . .
 The Court’s emphasis on overt discrimination in disparate treatment cases and its 
failure to take seriously the disparate impact of the test and the possibility of less 
discriminatory alternatives make it significantly easier for whites than racial minorities 
to bring race discrimination cases. This is because racial minorities have historically 
been harmed by structural discrimination that is better addressed by disparate impact 
cases. Because many of the structures challenged were designed with white men in 
mind, they tend to favor whites, even if the benefit may not be intentional. A limitation 
on disparate impact cases will, therefore, harm persons of color. Where a race-conscious 
remedy is considered intentional discrimination as it was in Ricci, white men are 
benefited, and persons of color lose. This result fosters a narrow definition of 
discrimination that embodies overt conscious acts, a definition that ignores the most 
recent social science research demonstrating the prevalence of subconsciously held 
negative attitudes by whites towards members of racial minorities. Besides minorities, 
women of all races will also lose from a redefinition of discrimination that disregards 
historical discrimination and that ignores implicit bias in favor of men.
 McGinley, Diluting Disparate Impact, supra note 67, at 638 (footnotes omitted).
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 While I do not agree with it, I recognize the appeal and simplicity of the 
colorblind approach: it apparently treats all equally and gives instructions to 
decisionmakers that are easier to follow. Moreover, as law professor Reva Siegel has 
argued, even without confirming a colorblind approach, the opinion may reflect an 
anti-balkanization theory.160 She argues that Justice Kennedy, the fifth vote for the 
majority and the author of the opinion, joined the majority not out of allegiance to a 
colorblind approach, but because of a more moderate fear of public balkanization 
that would result from upholding the lower courts’ orders.161 There is no question 
that Ricci is an important, emotional case for many white blue-collar workers who 
have seen the reduction of job security and earning power.
 My concern with Ricci, however, is that the Justices in the majority of the Court 
appear to have allowed their views about the substantive law of the case to affect 
their view of the facts. The majority should have followed its normal course when it 
announces a new standard: it should have remanded the case to the lower court. 
While it is true that a remand might have resulted in the lower court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court should have allowed the 
process to work. Even assuming that the majority of the Supreme Court decided to 
consider the evidence absent a remand, the majority should have exercised judicial 
humility. It should have recognized the role of the fact finder below and given 
deference to the roles of judges and juries. Anti-balkanization might support the 
substantive decision—that the defendant would have to prove its defense with a 
strong basis in the evidence when it uses the race of successful candidates to throw 
out the test results; as a matter of procedure, however, the Court should have 
remanded the case. If it had, the lower court could have, in its discretion, permitted 
more discovery so that the parties could meet their burdens of proof under the new 
standard. A remand may well have resulted in motions for summary judgment by 
both parties, and the trial court may have granted the plaintiffs’ motion given the 
new standard, but it, too, should act with judicial humility in deciding whether the 
grant of summary judgment is appropriate. It is likely that, upon remand, the case 
would have gone to a jury. The majority’s decision not to remand prevented the 
possibility of more discovery and of a jury trial to decide the facts of the case. Even if 
the lower court were to decide to grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs upon 
remand, the court of appeals and even the Supreme Court may have the opportunity 
to review the decision with a full record and briefings directed at the specific test 
announced by the Supreme Court majority.
160. According to Professor Siegel, “antibalkanization” is an emerging rationale used by moderate Supreme 
Court Justices when voting to uphold and limit affirmative action policies. The rationale is focused on 
promoting social cohesion, rather than advocating for American institutions to strive for colorblindness 
in their admissions and employment procedures. Colorblindness, in contrast, is a rationale used by more 
conservative Justices to argue against affirmative action; it advocates for American institutions to ignore 
race as a determinative factor because they believe that it will “protect individuals from the harm of 
categorization by race.” Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of 
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 Yale L.J. 1278, 1281–82, 1287 (2011).
161. See id. at 1332–48.
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 There are a number of familiar reasons for deference to the jury.162 One is 
competence. Juries are more able than courts of appeals to decide the credibility of 
the witnesses and to decide the factual issues before them. Courts of appeals look at 
records, not witnesses. Cold facts come to life through cross-examination. Another 
reason is the diversity of the jury pool, which should lead to more accurate results, 
and to acceptance of the resolution. A third is jury deliberation, which requires a 
give-and-take of jurors to reach a result. This give-and-take differs from that of the 
Supreme Court or the courts of appeals because of the diversity of the jurors, who, as 
one-time players, bring their views to the decisionmaking process.
 Finally, and overlapping the above reasons, as Kahan and his colleagues emphasized, 
juries grant the process democratic legitimacy. This is perhaps the most important role 
of the jury—guaranteeing to the litigants that their peers, and not a group of wealthy, 
educated lawyers, will decide their cases. It is here where Kahan’s theory and Siegel’s 
anti-balkanization principle may intersect and, to some extent, contradict one another. 
Anti-balkanization, as a justification for the decision in Ricci, defers to the views of the 
majority to assure peace, while paying little attention to the views of the minority who 
may feel harmed by the decision. Kahan’s concept of judicial humility, in light of naïve 
realism, encourages judges and justices to recognize that their own views of the facts 
are grounded in cultural connections, which may differ significantly from those of a 
significant minority of the population who have had different experiences. These 
theories, however, do not necessarily conflict if we see anti-balkanization as referring 
to substantive decisionmaking and Kahan’s call for judicial humility as referring to 
process. In other words, in Ricci, anti-balkanization may explain Justice Kennedy’s 
decision to join the majority in the substantive decision to overturn the lower court’s 
decision and create the strong basis in evidence defense. But it was perhaps an exercise 
in naïve realism that led the five-Justice majority in Ricci to make the procedural 
decision to grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs. It is here where judicial humility 
should be exercised because, even in light of a more rigid standard applied to the 
defendants, the process acknowledges the role that citizen fact finders play. As Kahan 
and his colleagues note, those holding the minority view of the facts can attempt to 
influence those holding the majority view during jury deliberations. And, even if the 
majority view of the facts prevails, those holding the minority view will at least feel 
that others have listened to them and dignified their views.163 This dignity accorded to 
a significant minority of citizens should lead to greater trust that the system represents 
the interests of all persons bound by it.
 But how do I know that the Justices in the majority in Ricci allowed their views 
of the substance to infect their factual findings? I don’t, necessarily; however, there 
are a number of clues from the decision and from these Justices’ views in other cases 
upon which I can rely. First, the four Justices in the majority who are considered the 
conservative bloc on the Court—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
162. For a complete discussion of the reasons why jury deliberations in Scott v. Harris would have been 
preferable, see Stempel, supra note 65, at 663–72.
163. See Kahan et al., supra note 20, at 901.
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and Alito—are all on record in other cases as believing in the colorblind approach to 
racial decision making.164 This approach focuses on the anti-classification principle: 
the wrong is the racial classification itself. The fifth member of the Ricci majority, 
Justice Kennedy, has refused to adopt a pure anti-classification approach,165 but may 
have joined the majority because of his interest in avoiding balkanization.166 These 
strongly professed views, combined with the significant evidence in Ricci, may be 
sufficient for us to conclude that the Justices’ procedural holding (or, in other words, 
their view of the facts) was inf luenced by their views on substance and by their 
cultural affiliations.
 But Ricci offers more. Besides the majority opinion, there are two concurrences—
by Justices Scalia and Alito—that may help explain why the majority decided to 
grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs. These concurrences demonstrate that at 
least three members of the five-member majority—Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito—had a hostile attitude toward the defendants’ position. While this was not a 
case about affirmative action, these Justices saw Ricci as a case of racial preferences, 
rather than a situation where the defendants sought to avoid illegal disparate 
impact.167 Their approach seems to question the validity of disparate impact as a 
cause of action, and to suspect the good will and honesty of the defendants.
 Justice Scalia’s concurrence, which Justice Alito joined, predicts that the disparate 
impact provision of Title VII will soon be subject to a serious, non-frivolous equal 
protection challenge168 because it permits racially based decision making that would 
likely otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The concurrence demonstrated discomfort with disparate impact and glee that the 
“evil day” is coming when the Court will be required to confront the question of 
whether, and to what extent, the disparate impact provision is consistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.169 Justice Scalia argues that 
the disparate impact provision may be unconstitutional because it places “a racial 
thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of 
their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. 
That type of racial decision making is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.”170
164. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality 
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) (“The way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In the eyes of government, 
we are just one race here. It is American.”). 
165. See Siegel, supra note 160, at 1303, 1305.
166. See id. at 1333–37.
167. There is a good argument that the entire majority saw this case as an affirmative action case in that they 
adopted the strong basis in evidence test, a test ordinarily used in the equal protection affirmative action 
cases. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582–83 (2009).
168. See id. at 594–96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. See id. at 592–93.
170. Id. at 594.
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 This is the first time that any member of the Court has raised the constitutionality 
of the disparate impact provision. The question of the constitutionality of the 
disparate impact provision is remarkable because it was the Supreme Court in Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co. in 1971 that originally interpreted Title VII to prohibit neutral 
policies and practices that have a disparate impact on a protected group.171 Clearly, 
the Supreme Court did not consider this interpretation to run afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when it decided Griggs. A number of Supreme Court cases followed 
that further developed the disparate impact cause of action.172 Years later, in 1989, 
after the composition of the Court had changed, the Court decided Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, which cut back on the disparate impact cause of action.173 
Congress responded by passing the 1991 Civil Rights Act, in large part to restore the 
disparate impact cause of action that was considered an important component of 
Title VII since the Griggs decision.174
 Justice Alito’s concurrence, which is joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, may 
be even more instructive. It begins by joining the opinion of the majority of the 
Court.175 It states that there are two questions to consider. First is the objective 
question of whether the reason given by the employer for refusing to promote the 
plaintiffs is a legitimate one. Even considering a legitimate reason, the second 
question is whether the legitimate reason given by the employer is pretextual.176 
Because the employer could not meet its burden of proving that its reason was 
legitimate (that is, that there was a strong basis in evidence that the plaintiffs had a 
successful disparate impact claim if the test were not thrown out), Justice Alito 
stated, the plaintiffs won the case. But the concurrence appears to say that even if the 
employer can prove that it has a legitimate reason, it could still be liable for disparate 
treatment if the plaintiffs prove that the defendants’ purported reason for throwing 
out the test is a pretext for discrimination.177
 Justice Alito’s concurrence concludes that facts in the record could lead a 
reasonable fact finder to conclude that the real reason for the decision to throw out 
the test results was political pressure on the mayor of New Haven, John DeStefano, 
by a politically connected African American preacher.178 This is an odd, intemperate 
opinion. For six pages, Justice Alito expounds an alternative narrative of the facts 
that is not even hinted at in the majority opinion. The purpose of the narrative, 
evidently, is to impugn the honesty of the City’s decision to throw out the test results, 
171. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
172. For a history of the disparate impact cause of action in Title VII, see Ricci, 557 U.S. at 620–26 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
173. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
174. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
175. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 596 (Alito, J., concurring).
176. See id. 
177. See id. 
178. See id. at 604–05.
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and to demonstrate that, because of political pressure applied by a powerful black 
citizen and community leader, Mayor DeStefano influenced the results of the CSB 
vote, resulting in CSB’s failure to certify the test. Justice Alito references Reverend 
Boise Kimber, a politically powerful African American pastor in New Haven who 
had personal ties to Mayor John DeStefano. He notes that the mayor testified for 
Rev. Kimber in 1996, then the manager of a funeral home, when the pastor was 
prosecuted for and convicted of stealing prepaid funeral expenses from an elderly 
woman.179 He also explains that the mayor selected Rev. Kimber to serve as chairman 
of the New Haven Board of Fire Commissioners until Rev. Kimber had to step 
down after making slurs about Italian American firefighters.180 According to the 
concurrence, soon after the test results were published in early 2004, Rev. Kimber 
met with the City’s chief administrative officer to give his opinion and to influence 
the City’s response.181
 The narrative in the concurrence suggests that the mayor’s office prevented the 
fire chief and assistant fire chief from testifying before the CSB because they favored 
certification,182 that when Mr. Legal, the IOS consultant, spoke to the City’s chief 
administrative officer, Karen Dubois-Walton, she was dismissive of Mr. Legal’s 
defense of the test, and that she and others discussed the potential political and racial 
effects on the City of certifying the test results.183 The narrative also suggests that 
Dr. Hornick’s testimony was influenced by the mayor’s secretary, who sent him news 
articles about the certification decision. It baldly states that Ms. Dubois-Walton 
admitted that the City rewarded Dr. Hornick for his testimony by giving him 
business.184 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg points out that at least some of the facts 
presented by Justice Alito have no support in the record, while others are drawn 
primarily from the petitioners’ statement of uncontested facts. She also claims that 
the concurrence exaggerates the facts, draws inferences, and creates suggestions.185
 In tone and content, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion is odd. The opinion takes 
no issue with anything in the majority opinion, but it differs from the majority 
opinion. It concludes that even if the dissent is legally correct in adopting the 
standard it recommends (good cause for throwing out the test results), it would be 
“untenable” to affirm the decision below. This is because, Justice Alito argues, the 
intent of the City is relevant to the ultimate outcome of the case and there are genuine 
issues of fact concerning the intent of the City. Nothing in the majority, however, 
seems to support the proposition that intent is important in this type of case. It never 
acknowledges that if the defendants were to make out their defense that they could 
179. Id. at 598–99.
180. See id. at 599.
181. See id. 
182. See id. at 599–600.
183. See id. at 600.
184. Id. at 603.
185. See id. at 638–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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still be liable if the plaintiffs were to prove that the asserted reason for throwing out 
the test results was pretextual.186
 It is surprising that the concurrence did not acknowledge that it set a different 
legal test than that established by the majority. But even odder than the legal 
description of the test is the description of the facts in which Justice Alito engaged. 
The opinion drips with emotion, anger, and hurt. One gets the feeling that the story 
resonated with Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas and that they believed that a 
politically powerful African American preacher who was prejudiced against Italian 
American firefighters used his relationship with the mayor of New Haven to assure 
that the test would not be certified.187
 As a procedural matter, the concurrence is curious. Assuming that the majority 
adopted the concurrence’s view of the law, the concurrence, combined with Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent, or even standing alone, clearly creates issues of fact for the fact 
finder. Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg battle over suggestions and insinuations—
clearly the realm of the jury.188 Justice Alito does not, however, appear to be arguing 
186. Justice Alito is clearly following the proof structure originally established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). But there is a question as to whether the McDonnell Douglas proof construct 
makes sense in this case. First, McDonnell Douglas is ordinarily used to establish discriminatory intent 
through inference in the absence of direct evidence. In other words, it allows the plaintiffs to create an 
inference that the employee’s race made a difference in the decision. Here, the plaintiffs argued that 
there was no question that the defendants made the decision to throw out the test results because of the 
race of the successful test takers. And, while the defendants did not admit that their behavior was 
illegal, intentional discrimination, they admitted that they threw out the test results because no African 
Americans and only two Hispanics would be immediately promotable if they used the test results. There 
would be no need to employ the McDonnell Douglas test in this situation because of this admission. But 
even if the McDonnell Douglas test were employed, the defendant’s burden would merely be to articulate 
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision. Here, the majority imposed on the 
defendant the burden of persuasion that it had a strong basis in evidence. This is a much heavier burden 
than the burden of articulation in McDonnell Douglas. For a number of reasons, then, this case is an 
uncomfortable fit with the traditional McDonnell Douglas proof construct. Its required proof, that there 
be a “strong basis in evidence,” is a Court-created affirmative defense, essentially similar to the bona 
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ ) defense. A BFOQ defense is an affirmative defense in which 
the employer admits that gender, religion, or national origin motivated the employer’s employment 
decision, but at the same time attempts to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected 
characteristic is “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006). The Second Circuit has 
interpreted the Ricci Court’s test to be an objective test measured at the time the public entity made the 
decision. It did not delve into the intent of the decision makers as Justice Alito seems to sanction. See, 
e.g., United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2011).
187. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, gives counterexamples to those 
mentioned in Justice Alito’s concurrence. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 608–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice 
Ginsburg demonstrates that there was also pressure on the CSB to certify the results. The dissent refers 
to threats made by the petitioners’ lawyer and statements made by firefighters who believed the test 
results should have been certified. Id. at 641. Both the concurrence and the dissent convey a very 
volatile, racially and politically charged atmosphere at the CSB hearings; but the dissent argues that it 
was not inconsistent for the defendant to have made a decision based on disparate impact while also 
under pressure to act. Id. at 641–42. Thus, the dissent sees a false dichotomy created by the concurrence. 
See id. at 642. 
188. Id. at 639 n.17.
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that the case should go to a jury. Instead, he recounts the “facts” from the plaintiffs 
about the pressure on the City, it appears, to give credence to the decision to grant 
summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the question of whether the defendants 
proved as a matter of law that they had a strong basis in evidence for throwing out 
the test results.
 While not explicit, these concurrences, in light of the evidence in the record, 
support the conclusion that at least these three Justices may have voted for summary 
judgment because of their discomfort with disparate impact law in general or because 
of their conviction that the defendants had acted improperly in this case.
 Kahan and colleagues suggest that there are situations when it may be appropriate 
for the Court to engage in fact finding. The most similar example to Ricci is the 
Court’s decision to engage in constitutional fact finding. As Kahan notes, the Court 
often reviews constitutional facts de novo.189 The reasons justifying this practice are 
the guarantee to minorities of the protection of constitutional rights to which the 
majority may be hostile and the importance of uniformity and predictability in 
constitutional rules.190 These justifications are particularly apt in the Fourth 
Amendment setting, where the Court’s constitutional fact finding gives law 
enforcement the tools to know what behavior is permissible and what behavior is not. 
In Ricci, unlike these cases, the Court was deciding Title VII doctrine, not 
constitutional doctrine. Although liability under Title VII and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may overlap in this context, the Court avoided 
deciding the constitutional issue in the case.
 Nonetheless, one can argue that the Court in Ricci engaged in fact finding in 
order to illuminate the limits of the strong basis in evidence test and the type of 
evidence necessary to prove job relatedness and less discriminatory alternatives in the 
disparate impact context. If this was the Court’s intent, it could have used examples 
to explain its position and remand the case to the lower court rather than deprive the 
defendants in Ricci of a jury trial. It seems more likely that the response to the Court’s 
opinion will be to deter government bodies from throwing out test results even where 
there is a fairly clear-cut case of disparate impact.191 Government employers who use 
consultants to create their tests and who attempt to create race-neutral questions will 
likely be shielded by the decision in Ricci. Unfortunately, this result shields 
government employers from liability for disparate impact and holds them liable only 
for intentional disparate treatment. Furthermore, the Court sent a message to those 
subcommunities that would see a different version of the facts. That message conveys 
disrespect to the subcommunities that would potentially see the facts through a 
different lens from that used by the majority of the Supreme Court.
189. Kahan et al., supra note 20, at 888 (citing Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. 
L. Rev. 229, 261–62 (1985)).
190. See id.
191. But see Brennan, 650 F.3d 65.
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iV. cOncLUsiOn: An UnfOrtUnAtE stAtE Of cOgnitiVE iLLibErALisM
 The Supreme Court in Ricci engaged in unnecessary fact finding when it 
concluded that the record blatantly contradicted the defendants’ arguments that the 
test used was not job related and that there were less discriminatory alternatives to 
the test. This factual finding occurred even though the Court announced a new test 
and did not provide the defendants the opportunity to develop the evidence to 
support its position given the newly announced test. This decision was unfortunate 
because it demonstrated disrespect for those subcommunities who would come to a 
different conclusion after hearing the defendants’ evidence. While the substantive 
decision in Ricci itself would likely be disappointing to certain subcommunities, it is 
the Court’s decision to grant summary judgment that may do the most damage. This 
decision deprives the defendants of the right to have a jury hear the case and deprives 
potential jurors, whose views of the facts might differ from those of the majority, of 
the ability to have their points of reference heard and considered by other jurors. In 
essence, the decision contributes to the state of cognitive illiberalism.
